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The Need for Security Training
• Understanding the fundamentals of security
• Faculty
• Staff
• Administrators
• Understanding the what (goal) and the why 
(reason) will help in deciding how best to 
achieve the goals
The Three D’s
• Detect
• The earlier an attacker is identified, the more 
time available to react and dispatch police
• Prevent
• Delay
• Slow the attacker’s progress to allow more time 
for police to arrive on-scene
• Dispatch
• Notify law enforcement to respond to situation
Security in Depth
• A key concept in physical security is 
security in depth
• Involves multiple layers of security
• Each layer slows the attacker which increases 
the odds of detection
• The cumulative effect of having to overcome 
multiple layers of security can result in a 
substantive delay time
• Seconds add up to minutes
• Minutes can save lives in an active shooter situation
Security in Depth
How Important is Delay?
• A recent FBI report found that in the 64 active 
shooter incidents for which a duration could be 
determined 69% ended in 5 minutes or less
• 36% ended in 2 minutes or less 
• The Sandy Hook shooting took approximately 6 
minutes from the first to last shot
• 20 children and 6 adults killed = 1 person every 14 
seconds
• First officers arrived on scene approximately 2 
minutes and 40 seconds into the event
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Hypothetical Example
Let’s assume it takes:
• 5 seconds to climb over the school’s fence
• 20 seconds to cross grounds to building
• 60 seconds to make entry into building
• 10 seconds to reach first classroom
• 60 second to breach door
Total delay = 2 minutes and 35 seconds
Remember Delay
• Can’t stop a determined attacker
• Can slow the attacker’s progress
• Slowing down an attacker can buy time to
• Detect the attack
• Warn others
• Lockdown or evacuate
• Call police
Exterior Security Barriers
Fencing
• 7 foot high chain link
• 9 gauge wire
• Twisted and barbed on top
• Knuckled at bottom
• No more than 2 inch opening in fabric
• Fence posts buried 36 inch deep set in 
concrete
• Posts no more than 10 feet apart
Open Space
• Open areas also provide delay and security
• Attacker must cross open ground to reach 
building
• Playgrounds
• Athletic fields
• Etc.
• Time to cross = delay
• Crossing open ground = chance of 
detection
Landscaping
• Plants can serve as a physical security 
barrier
• Dense hedges
• Evergreen
• Deciduous
• Can obscure visibility
• Good or bad?
Lighting
• Entrances and exterior windows should be 
well lit at night
• Considerations
• Color rendition
• Brightness
• Energy efficiency
• Maintenance costs
Security Cameras
Security Cameras
• Questions to ask:
• What do we hope to accomplish?
• Will cameras achieve that result?
• Where to place cameras?
• Are cameras the most effective use for security 
dollars?
• Recorded or analytics?
• Do not assume deterrence
• Suicidal mass shooters don’t care
Cameras
• Without analytics security cameras are only 
good for post-incident investigations
• Live monitoring is expensive
• My have value for other criminal activities
• Bullying
• Drugs
• Vandalism
Dummy Cameras
• NEVER USE!!!!!!
• Assumes deterrence 
• How long before people find out?
• Creates legal liability
• False sense of security
Camera Considerations
• Color or black and white?
• Fixed or pan/tilt/zoom?
• Lighting?
• Daytime glare
• Auto-iris
• Surface reflectivity
• Night time
• Adequate lighting and color rendition (color cameras)
• Recorded?
Doors and Locks
Doors
• Solid core
• Metal frame
• Windows should be impact resistant
• Wired glass is not impact resistant
• Laminated glass, polycarbonate, security film
• Exterior facing hinges should be peened or 
pinned
Doors
• Should be in good condition
• Repair or replace damaged doors
• Closed and locked at all times
• Elementary schools
• May not be possible in high schools
• Glass doors should have impact resistant 
glass
• Door closers functioning correctly
Locks
• All classrooms must have the ability to be 
locked from inside the classroom
• If doors lock with a key, teachers must have 
a key!!!
• Fire code compliant dead-bolts are best
• “Columbine Locks”
• Dead-latches at a minimum
Classroom Deadbolt
http://www.qualifiedhardware.com/brands/best-access-systems/45h7inl14h-626-classroom-intruder-function-
complete-mortise-lock-with-lever-and-rose-2943.cfm
Dead Latch
http://www.gaterslocksmith.com/Gaters%20-%20Locksmith%20-%20Locksets%20-%20Deadbolts.html
Windows
Windows
• All door windows, windows within 36 
inches of the door knob, or interior 
classroom window should have impact 
resistant glazing
Smash Resistant Film
Wired Glass
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x6Lmwl7y-9M
Sandy Hook Entry
Policies and Procedures
Policies and Procedures
• Are a key component for effective security
• Areas to address
• Access control policy
• Key policies
• Locked door policies
• Closed door policies
• Emergency response plan
• Lockdown/Evacuation
Enforcement
• Gain voluntary compliance from faculty and 
staff
• Explain the reason for the rule – WHY?
• People are more willing to comply if they 
understand the reason for a rule and the reason 
makes sense
• Enforce policies
• If faculty and staff will not comply take 
progressive corrective action
Policies and Procedures
• The most expensive and sophisticated 
physical security system in the world will 
not work if security policy is not followed.
• Security and convenience are inversely 
proportional
• Security increases – convenience decreases
• Convenience increases – security decreases
• Why I am being inconvenienced?
Training
Security Training
• Lockdown training is not enough!!!
• Lockdown is not always the best option
• Evacuation, fighting back, etc
• Basic principles of risk assessment and 
physical security
• Policies and procedures
• Spotting suspicious activity and behaviors
Security Training
• Consider plain language instead of code 
words
• Lockdown is a code word
Security Training
• Case studies
• Studying past cases to learn from others
• Bath, Michigan
• University of Texas – Austin
• Columbine
• Virginia Tech
• Jonesboro, Arkansas
• Amish Schoolhouse
• Can help identify vulnerabilities or threats to 
your school

Case Study
Project Overview
• Spring 2013
• Class project by the students in SIS-495A 
Intelligence, Risk Analysis, and Measured 
Response
• Students had an opportunity to apply the 
knowledge gained in the classroom to the 
real world
Project Overview
• The project took 10 weeks ( - spring break) 
from initiation to completion
• 25 students and two instructors surveyed 
two buildings and ~ 2 acres of land in 2 
hours
• The emergency response plan is taken from 
the Arizona School Site Emergency 
Response plan template and modified to fit 
the needs of the school
Methodology
• Students researched and taught each other 
information about key incidents of school 
violence to understand how these attacks 
were conducted
• Bath, Michigan 
• Virginia Tech
• Columbine
• Jonesboro, Arkansas
• Thurston High School shooting
• University of Texas at Austin
• Amish School House Massacre
Researched
• Demographics
• Crime statistics
• Homeless mental health issues
• Natural disasters
• Possible nearby sources of man-made 
disasters
• Emergency response planning
• School security
Teams
• Divided into 7 teams
• Asset team
• School interior
• School exterior
• Preschool 
• Red team/video
• Photography
• Bomb assessment
School Interior Findings
• School's access control system is 
ineffective
• Broken dead latches on some doors
• Wired glass windows on classroom doors 
(safety hazard)
• Duress codes posted in the open
• Duress code too obvious
• Clutter throughout the building
School Interior Findings
• Doors propped open
• Too many false alarms
• Inadequate policies and procedures
• Enforcement 

Findings
• Classrooms did not have first aid kits
• Staff did not know where medical supplies 
were located
• Floor plans with evacuation routes were not 
present 
• Multiple evacuation routes were not present
Recommendations
Close and lock hallway 
doors during school 
hours
• Only preschool 
employees allowed in 
hallway
• Hallway doors should 
swing out and have 
panic bars
• Ensure policies and 
procedures are 
followed
Recommendations
Door Upgrades
• Install deadbolts on 
Rooms 115 and 117.
• Eliminate Dutch door 
between preschool 
office and classroom
• Install solid core door 
with deadbolt.
• Replace exterior 
preschool office 
entrance door.
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between preschool 
office and classroom
• Install solid core door 
with deadbolt.
• Replace exterior 
preschool office 
entrance door.
Recommendations
• Eliminate 
windows near 
hallway doors
• Install smash 
resistant film

Outcome
• All wired glass replaced with laminated 
smash resistant glass
• All door knobs replaced
• Door closers fixed
• Developed security culture
• Improved security policies
• Remodeled preschool
Outcome
• Evacuation plans posted throughout buildings
• Knox box and floor plan lock box
• Closed off hallway to preschool
• Access control system
• Camera and intercom system
• Replaced or repaired doors
• Built bathroom for preschoolers
Pending Improvements
• Fire exit alarms for 
preschool area
Outcomes
• Safer faculty, staff, and children
• 25 very proud college students and recent 
graduates
• Plus one professor
